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I. INTRODUCTION
United States Bankruptcy law is premised on the idea of providing
debtors with a fresh start. As the Supreme Court stated in Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt,1 one of the central policies of our bankruptcy law is to
give "the honest but unfortunate debtor.., a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt."2 Despite the strong adherence
to policy supporting a fresh start, the general rule of dischargeability
has long been limited by a number of exceptions prohibiting the dis-
charge of certain types of debt, including debts arising from a willful
and malicious injury.3 The discharge exception for willful and mali-
cious injuries first appeared in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.4 Through-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Chad A. Cutshall, Nebraska Wesleyan University, B.S., 1997; University of
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1. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
2. Id. at 244.
3. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 56, 61-62
(1990).
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 554.
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out its history, the scope of the willful and malicious injury discharge
exception has been the source of confusion. In Kawaauhau v. Geiger,5
the Supreme Court addressed a circuit split regarding the proper in-
terpretation of the term "willful" under the discharge exception.
In Kawaauhau, Justice Ginsburg authored the unanimous opinion
of the Court, holding that the term "willful" in the discharge exception
for willful and malicious injury is satisfied only by a deliberate or in-
tentional injury.6 This holding correctly resolved the circuit split re-
garding the proper meaning to be given to the term "willful" by
limiting the exception to debts arising from intentional injuries.
Although Kawaauhau correctly resolved the circuit split regarding
the proper interpretation of willfulness under the exception, the deci-
sion did not clearly define the scope of the term "intent" as used by the
Court to describe willful conduct. The Court's failure to clearly define
"intent" under the definition of willful creates a risk that Kawaauhau
will narrow the willful and malicious discharge exception to a point
where the exception will no longer be able to separate the honest and
unfortunate debtor from the culpable debtor whose debt should be
rendered nondischargeable under the exception. To prevent this re-
sult, it is necessary to interpret the term "intent" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) as including both intent to injure and subjective knowledge
that injury is substantially certain to result. Under this interpreta-
tion of intent, the discharge exception will serve its function in render-
ing the debts of culpable debtors nondischargeable while at the same
time allowing honest debtors an opportunity for a fresh start.
This Note will examine the Supreme Court's holding in
Kawaauhau and the proper scope to be given to the term "intent" as
used by the Court. First, this Note will present a history of the willful
and malicious injury discharge exception in United States bankruptcy
law including a summary of the Kawaauhau holding. Second, this
Note will examine the Supreme Court's holding in Kawaauhau, which
correctly interpreted willfulness under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) to require
intent to injure. Finally, this Note will examine the proper interpreta-
tion to be given to the term "intent" as used by the Court in
Kawaauhau to enable the discharge exception to serve its function of
excepting the discharge of debts arising from willful and malicious
injuries.
5. 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
6. See id. at 977.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)
The Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge debts arising from a
"willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity."7 The willful and malicious injury dis-
charge exception first appeared as section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.8 Soon after its enactment, the exception was interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Colwell.9 Nearly a century after
the decision, an understanding of Tinker remains essential to the
proper interpretation of the willful and malicious injury discharge ex-
ception as codified in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).1o
In Tinker, the debtor, Charles Tinker, filed bankruptcy following a
$50,000 judgment rendered against him for criminal conversation
(adultery) with Frederick Colwell's wife. Mr. Colwell raised objection
to discharge of the judgment, arguing that Mr. Tinker's actions consti-
tuted a willful and malicious injury rendering the judgment nondis-
chargeable under § 17a(2). The Tinker Court held the judgment
nondischargeable after finding that the judgment for criminal conver-
sation was based upon a willful and malicious injury as defined in
§ 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.11
In its examination of the discharge exception, the Tinker Court ad-
dressed willfulness and malice as separate statutory requirements.12
Under § 17a(2), the Court defined "willfulness" to mean "intentional
and voluntary."13 The Court defined "malice" in its legal sense as "a
wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse."14 In
addition, the Court clearly indicated that malice could be implied from
the circumstances of the case. 15 The Court stated that "the act itself
necessarily implies that degree of malice which is sufficient to bring
the case within the exception stated in the statute" and "it is not nec-
essary that the cause of action be based upon special malice."1 6
After separately defining willfulness and malice under the dis-
charge exception, the Tinker Court announced a test incorporating
both the willful and malicious elements of the exception:
[We think a willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act which
is against good morals, and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily
7. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)(1994).
8. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 61-62.
9. 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
10. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 66.
11. See Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 489-90 (1904).
12. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 66.
13. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 485.
14. Id. at 485-86.
15. See id. at 485.
16. Id.
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causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and
maliciously, so as to come within the exception.
1 7
This language led to decades of confusion regarding the proper inter-
pretation of the willful and malicious injury discharge exception.' 8 In
the early 20' Century, many courts incorrectly interpreted this lan-
guage as allowing a "reckless disregard" standard under which reck-
less conduct by the debtor could satisfy the requirements of the willful
and malicious discharge exception.' 9
The Supreme Court next encountered the willful and malicious dis-
charge exception in McIntyre v. Kavanaugh.20 In McIntyre, the dis-
charge exception was raised after the creditor brought a successful
suit for conversion against the debtor. Quoting the combined test for
willful and malicious injury announced in Tinker, the McIntyre Court
found circumstances sufficient to show that the conversion was both
willful and malicious and consequently denied discharge of the conver-
sion debt.21
In Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co.,22 the Supreme Court again ex-
amined the willful and malicious injury exception arising from an ac-
tion for conversion of a security interest. R.H. Davis, an automobile
dealer, obtained a loan from Aetna Acceptance Company to purchase
an automobile. Davis secured payment of the loan with a chattel
mortgage covering the automobile. In violation of the agreement, Da-
vis sold the automobile without Aetna's consent and only later gave
notice of the transaction to an Aetna representative. 2 3 Evidence sug-
gests that on many other occasions, cars held by Davis on similar
terms had been sold without Aetna's express consent and the proceeds
accounted for thereafter. On this occasion, Davis did not remit the
proceeds of the sale to Aetna and subsequently petitioned for bank-
ruptcy. Aetna brought action against Davis for conversion.2 4
In holding the debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, the Davis Court
stated that every act of conversion does not necessarily constitute a
willful and malicious injury.25 The Court held that "[t]here may be a
conversion which is innocent or technical, an unauthorized assump-
tion of dominion without willfulness or malice."2 6 The Davis Court
17. Id. at 487.
18. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 67.
19. See id. The reckless disregard standard was subsequently overruled by the legis-
lative history accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Cassidy v.
Minihan, 794 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320-21).
20. 242 U.S. 138 (1916).
21. See id. at 141-42.
22. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
23. See id. at 330.
24. See id. at 331.
25. See id. at 332.
26. Id. (citations omitted).
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believed "[there may be an honest but mistaken belief, engendered by
a course of dealing, that powers have been enlarged or incapacities
removed" and under such circumstances "what is done is a tort, but
not a willful and malicious one."27 Under the facts before it, the Court
did not find the requisite willfulness or malice and discharged the debt
"as against a showing of conversion without aggravating features."28
Lower courts following Tinker, McIntyre and Davis often misinter-
preted these holdings to allow reckless conduct to satisfy the willful
and malicious injury discharge exception. 29 Many of these cases in-
volved injury resulting from the reckless operation of an automobile. 30
Cases allowing reckless conduct to satisfy § 523(a)(6) were directly
overruled in the Judiciary Committee Reports accompanying the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
When the Bankruptcy Code was revised under the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978, the words of the willful and malicious discharge ex-
ception remained unchanged as codified in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 31
However, in enacting the modern exception, reports of the Senate and
the House of Representatives Judiciary Committees accompanying
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 expressly addressed Tinker and
expressed their intent regarding the proper meaning to be given to the
word "willful" as used in the exception. The Committee Reports from
both the Senate and the House of Representatives, in nearly identical
language, indicated that the word willful was to mean "deliberate or
intentional" and that to "the extent that Tinker v. Colwell . . . held"
that a "less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other
cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard,
they are overruled."32 The Committee Reports were largely successful
in abrogating the 'reckless disregard' standard for willfulness. 33
27. Id.
28. Id. at 333.
29. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 70-71.
30. See id.
31. See Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 521 U.S. 1153 (1997), and affd, 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
32. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5865. The language of the House of Representatives report was nearly
identical to that of the Senate, stating "to the extent that Tinker v. Colwell...
held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have
relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320-21 (emphasis added).
33. A number of courts continued to hold reckless conduct sufficient to satisfy 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), mainly in the context of drunk-driving liability. See, e.g.,
Moraes v. Adams (In re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
drunk-driving debts nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)); Hartford Ins. Group v.
Galvan (In re Galvan), 39 B.R. 663, 665 (D. Colo. 1984) (holding that the report of
the Judiciary Committee is insufficient to overrule the Tinker interpretation of
"willful and malicious injury," where Congress did not change the language of the
[Vol. 78:470
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Although the Committee Reports clarified the issue of whether reck-
less conduct satisfied § 523(a)(6)'s willfulness requirement, courts con-
tinued to apply the willful and malicious discharge exception
inconsistently.
Following the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, courts spent consid-
erable time wrestling with the willful and malicious injury discharge
exception.3 4 Although most of this time was spent trying to derive a
proper definition of "malice" under the exception,3 5 a split in circuits
developed concerning the proper application of § 523(a)(6)'s willful-
ness requirement.3 6 Courts were relatively consistent in defining
"willful" as deliberate or intentional pursuant to the instructions of
the Committee Reports accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978,37 but they were split on whether this language required a delib-
erate and intentional act causing injury or a deliberate and inten-
tional injury.3S This was the question framed and answered by the
Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, which held that willfulness
under § 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury.3 9
B. Kawaauhau v. Geiger
In Kawaauhau v. Geiger, the Supreme Court addressed the circuit
split regarding the proper interpretation of "willful" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6). The issue, as framed by the Court, was whether the com-
pass of § 523(a)(6)'s discharge exception "cover[s] acts, done intention-
ally, that cause injury... or only acts done with the actual intent to
cause injury."40 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that interpreted the willful element of
exception). This position was largely resolved by a 1984 Amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code creating 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9), a specific discharge exception for
debts arising from injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.
34. See Cassidy v. MVinihan, 794 F.2d 340, 343-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing various
interpretations of § 523(a)(6) in the context of drunk-driving debts following the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
35. The proper definition of"malice" under § 523(a)(6) has been the source of consid-
erable controversy between circuits. At least four separate tests for "malice"
under § 523(a)(6) have been advanced including the "implied" malice test, the
"special" malice test, the "targeted at the creditor" test and the "totality of the
circumstances" test. See ITT Consumer Discount Co. v. Horldt (In re Horldt), 86
B.R. 823, 824-25 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (discussing the four approaches to malice
under § 523(a)(6)).
36. See Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that "bank-
ruptcy courts have been divided as to whether the statute requires an intentional
act that results in injury or an act with intent to cause injury").
37. See Farmers Ins. Group v. Compos (In re Compos), 768 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir.
1985).
38. See Perkins, 817 F.2d at 393.
39. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 (1998).
40. Id.
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§ 523(a)(6) to require a deliberate or intentional injury.4 1 Because the
Court was unable to find evidence that the debtor, Dr. Geiger, in-
tended to injure the creditor, Mrs. Margaret Kawaauhau, the debt
was held dischargeable. 42
In Kawaauhau, Mrs. Kawaauhau sought medical treatment from
Dr. Paul Geiger after dropping a box on her right foot.43 During her
visit with Dr. Geiger, Mrs. Kawaauhau complained of chills, dizziness,
fever, and pain in her right calf. After diagnosing her condition as
thrombophlebitis of the right leg, Dr. Geiger admitted Mrs.
Kawaauhau to the hospital for treatment and prescribed oral does of
tetracycline. After conducting tests, Dr. Geiger determined that con-
tinued administration of the oral tetracycline would be an effective
treatment of her condition. Dr. Geiger eventually prescribed oral pen-
icillin in place of the tetracycline.44 Dr. Geiger then departed on a
business trip leaving Mrs. Kawaauhau in the care of other physicians
who began to administer intramuscular penicillin and decided to
transfer her to an infectious disease specialist.45 Upon returning, Dr.
Geiger discontinued all antibiotics, believing that the infection had
run its course. A few days later, Mrs. Kawaauhau's condition deterio-
rated and her right leg had to be amputated below the knee.4 6
Mr. and Mrs. Kawaauhau (the "Kawaauhaus") succeeded in an ac-
tion for malpractice against Dr. Geiger who subsequently petitioned
for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.47 The
Kawaauhaus filed a complaint requesting that the bankruptcy court
deny discharge of the malpractice judgment on the ground that it con-
stituted a debt for willful and malicious injury excepted from dis-
charge by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Bankruptcy Court held the debt
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), concluding that Dr. Geiger's
treatment of Mrs. Kawaauhau "was so far below the standard level of
care that it can be categorized as willful and malicious conduct for
dischargeability purposes." 48 In an unpublished order, the district
court affirmed.49
41. See id.
42. See id. at 978.
43. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger (In re Geiger), 172 B.R. 916, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1994), rev'd, 93 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc, 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1153 (1997), and affd, 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 917-918.
47. See id. at 919.
48. Id. at 923.
49. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 976 (1998).
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A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, 50 and in a subsequent rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit
adhered to the panel's position.5 1 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that under the statute, "the word 'willful'... modifies the
word 'injury,' so that what is required for nondischargeability is a de-
liberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional
act."5 2 The court of appeals recognized that the word "intentional"
causes a lawyer's mind to think of the category of intentional torts,
which are based upon "the consequences of an act rather than the act
itself."53 The court of appeals held that "for a judgment debt to be
nondischargeable under the relevant statutory provision, it is neces-
sary that it be based on the commission of an intentional tort."5 4 Be-
cause there was no indication that Dr. Geiger intended injury or that
he believed injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the dis-
trict court and permitted discharge of the debt.55
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Murphy criticized the ma-
jority opinion for requiring intent to injure to satisfy the discharge ex-
ception. 56 Judge Murphy argued that neither the legislative history
nor the language of the statute suggested that willfulness under
§ 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure or that application of the excep-
tion should be limited to intentional torts.5 7 In addition, Judge Mur-
phy recognized that no other circuit required an intentional injury to
satisfy the discharge exception and such a requirement would under-
mine the purpose of § 523(a)(6) by placing a nearly impossible burden
on a creditor to show that the debtor intended to do him harm.58
In a unanimous opinion penned by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
holding that "debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted in-
juries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6)." 5 9 The Court con-
curred with the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the plain language
of the statute and the similarity of the exception to the category of
50. See Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 93 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'g en
banc, 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1153, and affd, 118 S.
Ct. 974 (1998).
51. See Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 521 U.S. 1153, and affjd, 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
52. Id. at 852.
53. Id. (quoting RESTATFMENT (SEcoND) TORTS § 8A cmt. a, at 15 (1965)).
54. Id. at 853.
55. See id. at 854. The court held that at worst Dr. Geiger's conduct could be de-
scribed as reckless. See id. at 853.
56. See id. at 857 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 860 (citing Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303, 308 (3d Cir.
1994)).
59. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 978 (1998).
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intentional torts.60 Affirming the decision of the Eighth Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) re-
quires a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or
intentional act that leads to injury.6 1
The Court reasoned that had Congress intended § 523(a)(6) to pre-
vent the discharge of debts resulting from reckless conduct it might
have described "willful acts that cause injury" or it might have used
additional words such as "reckless" or "negligent," to modify "in-
jury."6 2 The Court also recognized that a broad definition of intent
would cause a wide range of situations to come within the exception to
discharge, including traffic accidents where the act causing the acci-
dent was intentional but the resulting injury was not.63 In addition,
the Court expressed reluctance to adopt an interpretation of the ex-
ception that would render another portion of the same law superflu-
ous. 64 For these reasons the Supreme Court held that "debts arising
from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the
compass of § 523(a)(6)."65
III. ANALYSIS
Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge,
debts arising from a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to an-
other entity or to the property of another entity."6 6 "Willful" and "ma-
licious" are distinct elements in the § 523(a)(6) analysis.67 To have a
debt excepted from discharge, the creditor must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence68 that the injury caused by the debtor was both
willful and malicious. 6 9 In Kawaauhau v. Geiger, the Supreme Court
held that "debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injury
60. See id. at 977.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. Under the interpretation of the discharge exception advanced by the
Kawaauhaus, permitting reckless conduct to satisfy the exception, there would be
no need for § 523(a)(9), which excepts from discharge, debts for death or personal
injury caused by the debtor's unlawful operation of a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1996).
65. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 978 (1998).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1996).
67. See Barclays AmJBus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 880-81 (8th
Cir. 1985).
68. See Berger v. Buck (In re Buck), 220 B.R. 999, 1004 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 (1991)).
69. See In re Long, 774 F.2d at 880-81; Allstate Ins. v. Dzuik (In re Dzuik), 218 B.R.
485, 487 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998); American Bank v. McCune (In re McCune), 85
B.R. 834, 837 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (holding that willfulness and maliciousness
are analyzed separately and both must be found to justify exception from
discharge).
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do not fall with the compass of § 523(a)(6)."7o The Kawaauhau Court
came to this conclusion following an examination of the proper mean-
ing of the term "willful" as contained in the willful and malicious in-
jury discharge exception. By limiting willfulness to situations where
the debtor intends injury, Kawaauhau correctly resolved the circuit
split concerning the proper interpretation of willfulness under the
exception.
Although the Kawaauhau Court correctly resolved the circuit split
concerning the proper interpretation of willfulness, the Supreme
Court did not clearly define the scope of "intent" as used under the
exception. However, a careful examination of the Kawaauhau opinion
suggests that either subjective intent to injure or subjective knowl-
edge that injury is substantially certain to result may satisfy intent.
This interpretation of the scope of intent provides the correct balance
between policy favoring a fresh start for honest debtors and the policy
of the discharge exception to protect creditors from the discharge of
certain types of debt.
A. The Proper Standard for "Willful" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6)
The House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports accompany-
ing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 unambiguously define the
word "willful" as used in § 523(a)(6) as "deliberate or intentional."71
Although courts have consistently defined "willful" as deliberate or in-
tentional pursuant to congressional intent,7 2 prior to Kawaauhau, cir-
cuits were split on whether a showing of willfulness under § 523(a)(6)
required a deliberate or intentional act resulting in injury or a deliber-
ate or intentional injury.7 3 The question, as posed by the Supreme
Court in Kawaauhau, was whether the compass of § 523(a)(6)'s dis-
charge exception "cover[s] acts done intentionally, that cause injury
* * or only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury."74 In
Kawaauhau, the Supreme Court held that the willful element of§ 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury.75 This interpretation of
willfulness is consistent with the plain language of the statute, the
legislative history of the statute, and the general policy of the bank-
70. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 978 (1998).
71. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A-N. 5787, 5868; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6320-21.
72. See Karen N. Fischer, The Exception to Discharge for Willful and Malicious In-
jury: The Proper Standard for Malice, 7 BmAaK. DEvs. J. 245, 245 (1990).
73. See Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 1987).
74. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 (1998).
75. See id.
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ruptcy code to narrowly construe discharge exceptions to provide hon-
est debtors with a fresh start.
Any attempt at statutory construction should begin with an exami-
nation of the statutory language itself and then proceed to the legisla-
tive history if the statutory language is unclear.7 6 As recognized by
the Supreme Court, an examination of the plain language of the will-
ful and malicious injury discharge exception reveals that the word
"willful" modifies the word "injury."77 This construction strongly sug-
gests that the willful element of the discharge exception requires a
deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional
act resulting in injury.7 8
In addition, as the Kawaauhau Court noted, the statute contains
no language suggesting a broader interpretation of willfulness under
the exception.7 9 Generally exceptions to discharge should be confined
to those plainly expressed.8o Had Congress intended a broader inter-
pretation of the discharge exception, it might have instead described
"willful acts that cause injury" or included additional words such as
"reckless" or "negligent" to modify the word "injury."S1 Likewise, the
statute makes no mention of acts causing injury. Because the word
"willful" clearly modifies "injury" under the exception and Congress
included no language to suggest a broader meaning, the plain lan-
guage of the statute strongly suggests that an intentional injury is
required.
The Supreme Court in Kawaauhau also recognized that the
§ 523(a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer's mind the category of
"intentional torts" which generally require that the actor intend the
injury, not merely the act causing the injury.8 2 The Court, quoting
from comment a of section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
76. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) ("Where... the resolution of a question
of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is
unclear.") (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)); see also Penn-
sylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557 (1990) (recogniz-
ing that construction of a term in a statute must be guided by the fundamental
canon that statutory interpretations begin with the language of the statute it-
self); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (holding that
the plain meaning of legislation is conclusive except where the result of a literal
application of the statute is at odds with intention of the drafters).
77. See Kawaauhau, 118 S. Ct. at 977; see also Farmers Ins. Group v. Compos (In re
Compos), 768 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that the adjective "will-
ful" modifies "injury" requiring a willful injury).
78. See In re Compos, 768 F.2d at 1158.
79. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 (1998).
80. Id. (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)).
81. See id.
82. See id.
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noted that intentional torts generally require that the actor intend
"the consequences of an act," not simply "the act itself."83
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 also supports
the holding of Kawaauhau that requires intent to injure to satisfy
willfulness under the discharge exception. Prior to enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the law regarding the willful and ma-
licious injury discharge exception was largely governed by Tinker v.
Colwell.84 In Tinker, the Court held that "a willful disregard of what
one knows to be his duty, an act which is against good morals and
wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury and is
done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and maliciously, so
as to come within the exception."85 This language from Tinker was
interpreted by a line of cases to mean that a willful injury could be
established by a showing of the debtor's reckless disregard of duty.8 6
However, this interpretation of the Tinker language was clearly re-
jected by the Judiciary Committee Reports of both the Senate and
House of Representatives accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978.87
In the Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, the Senate defined willful as "deliberate or intentional"
and stated that "[t]o the extent that Tinker v. Colwell . . . held that a
less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases
have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are
overruled."8 8 Because the Judiciary Committee Report defined "will-
ful" to mean deliberate or intentional, and they clearly required a de-
gree of culpability greater than recklessness to satisfy the willful
requirement, it is clear that Congress intended to restrict nondis-
83. Id. (citing REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 8A cmt. a (1965)) (emphasis
omitted).
84. See Barclays AmJBus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 879 (8th
Cir. 1985).
85. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 487 (1904).
86. See, e.g., Den Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1955) (holding an
injury from reckless operation of an automobile nondischargeable); Harrison v.
Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946) (holding that the law may imply that a
negligent act evincing reckless indifference to rights of others is done
intentionally).
87. It is of significance that these statements were rejected by the reports of the Sen-
ate and House Judiciary Committees accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. As recognized in Garcia v. United States, "the authoritative source for
finding the Legislatures intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which
'represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen
involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.'" 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)
(quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
88. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N.
5878, 5865; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6320-21.
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chargeability under § 523(a)(6) to situations involving an intended
injury.8 9
Although the Committee Reports do not specify the exact standard
to be adopted in lieu of the reckless disregard standard that was ex-
pressly rejected, the Reports have been correctly interpreted to re-
quire intent to injure to satisfy willfulness. The Committee Reports
do not specifically indicate whether willfulness may be satisfied by in-
tent to do an act resulting in injury or whether subjective intent to
injure is required. 90 Although not expressly requiring intent to injure,
the fact that the Reports directly overruled cases adopting a reckless
disregard standard indicates that a mere showing of an act resulting
in injury is insufficient to establish willfulness under the discharge
exception.
If the Committee Reports were read to allow an intentional act re-
sulting in injury to satisfy willfulness, reckless or even negligent con-
duct might still be sufficient to satisfy willfulness under the exception.
As the Eighth Circuit recognized "[e]very act that is not literally com-
pelled by the physical act of another.., or the result of an involuntary
muscle spasm, is a 'deliberate or intentional' one, and if it leads to
injury, a judgment debt predicated on it would be immune from dis-
charge."9 1 However, Congress made clear that it intended to overrule
the reckless disregard standard.92 Therefore, to give effect to congres-
sional intent to make reckless conduct insufficient to satisfy willful-
ness, it is necessary to require a deliberate or intentional injury.
The Kawaauhaus relied heavily on Tinker v. Colwell which held a
judgment for criminal conversation nondischargeable. 9 3 In Tinker,
the Supreme Court held that specific intent to injure is not required
under the willful and malicious injury discharge exception.9 4 Under
the normal rule of statutory construction, if Congress intends for legis-
lation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it
must make that intent specific. 95 However, as discussed above, the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 clearly
evinces congressional intent to change the Tinker Court's interpreta-
89. See Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340, 343-44 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Farmers
Ins. Group v. Compos (In re Compos), 768 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that § 523(a)(6) requires an intentional or deliberate injury).
90. See Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
91. Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 521 U.S. 1153 (1997), and affd, 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
92. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320-21.
93. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 (1998).
94. See Tinker v. Colwel, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904).
95. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 (1986).
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tion of the willfulness requirement contained in the discharge excep-
tion as codified in § 523(a)(6).
Not only is the Kawaauhau Court's interpretation of willfulness
under § 523(a)(6) consistent with the plain language and legislative
history of the statute, the interpretation is consistent with the general
policy of bankruptcy law that exceptions from discharge are to be nar-
rowly construed to give debtors an opportunity for a fresh start. The
United States Bankruptcy law is based on the long-standing policy of
affording the honest, but unfortunate debtor a discharge from debts
and an opportunity to rehabilitate their financial affairs.9 6 The re-
striction of the willful and malicious discharge exception to cases in-
volving an intentional injury furthers the fresh start policy of the
bankruptcy code by protecting honest debtors while at the same time
protecting the victims of intentional conduct from the discharge of
claims based on willful and malicious injuries.
B. The Scope of Intentional Injury Under Kawaauhau v.
Geiger
Although the Kawaauhau Court correctly defined "willfulness"
under § 523(a)(6) to require a deliberate or intentional injury, the
Court did not clearly define the term "intent" under the exception.97
Specifically, the Court did not indicate whether willfulness must be
established by a showing that the debtor had a subjective intent to
injure the creditor or whether willfulness may be established by show-
ing that the debtor had subjective knowledge that injury was substan-
tially certain to result from his acts. The resulting ambiguity
concerning the scope of intent creates the possibility that the willful
and malicious injury discharge exception will no longer be able to sep-
arate the honest and unfortunate debtor from the culpable debtor
whose debt should be rendered nondischargeable under the exception.
A careful examination of Kawaauhau suggests that a showing of
either subjective intent to injure or subjective knowledge that injury is
substantially certain to result may satisfy the intent requirement.
This interpretation of "intent" under Kawaauhau will insure that
creditors will be able to render the debts of culpable debtors nondis-
chargeable while still allowing the honest debtor an opportunity for a
fresh start.
96. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 56-57; see also Molitor v. Eidson (In re Molitor), 76 F.3d
218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the "purpose of the bankruptcy code is to
afford the honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh start, not to shield those who
abuse the bankruptcy process in order to avoid paying debts"); Johnson v. Miera
(In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the underlying policy
of the Bankruptcy Code is to give debtors a fresh start).
97. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 (1998).
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Justice Ginsburg's definition of "intent" clearly encompasses sub-
jective intent by the debtor to cause injury to the creditor. However,
the Kawaauhau opinion fails to address whether intent also encom-
passes acts done intentionally which are known by the actor to be sub-
stantially certain to cause injury. A number of circuits have held that
subjective substantial certainty of injury is insufficient to satisfy
§ 523(a)(6) willfulness under Kawaauhau.9 8 However, the Supreme
Court's reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts' definition of "in-
tent" suggests that intent would include circumstances where the
debtor has subjective knowledge that injury is substantially certain to
result.9 9 This reading of intent provides the logical balancing point
allowing creditors the ability to protect debt while at the same time
granting a fresh start to honest debtors.
Although the Court in Kawaauhau never expressly considered the
"substantially certain" alternative of intent, it is an integral compo-
nent of section of the Restatement embraced by the Court.lOO In
Kawaauhau, to support its reading of the plain language of
§ 523(a)(6), the Court quoted a portion of comment a to Section 8A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts which limits the use of intent to
circumstances where the actor intends the consequences of his act and
not simply the act itself.lol A complete reading of the Restatement
section advanced by the Kawaauhau Court indicates that intent is
satisfied where the actor believes that his acts are substantially cer-
tain to cause injury.lO2 Section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines the word "intent" as used in the Restatement to mean
"that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he
believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from
it."103 The substantial certainty test for intent is explained in Com-
ment b to Section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Intent is not... limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows
that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his
act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to
produce the result. 104
98. See, e.g., Hartley v. Jones (Matter of Hartley), 869 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the Bankruptcy Code requires that the defendant intended to cause
injury); Berger v. Buck (In re Buck), 220 B.R. 999, 1004 (B-.AP. 10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the willful standard requires evidence that the debtor had "motive
to harm" the creditor); Florida Outdoor Equip., Inc. v. Tomlinson (In re Tomlin-
son), 220 B.R. 134, 137-38 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (stating that the Eleventh
Circuit's "substantially certain" standard is inconsistent with Kawaauhau v. Gei-
ger and applying a strict "intent to cause injury" standard).
99. See Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1994).
100. See McAlister v. Slosberg (In re Slosberg), 225 B.R. 9, 19 (Bankr. D. Me. 1998).
101. See Kawaauhau, 118 S. Ct. at 977.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
103. Id.
104. Id. at cmt. b.
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The Restatement makes clear that subjective knowledge that in-
jury is substantially certain to result is sufficient to satisfy the intent
requirement for intentional torts. Because the Kawaauhau Court
compares § 523(a)(6) to an intentional tort and quotes language from
the Restatement, the scope of intent as used in Kawaauhau is correctly
read to include subjective knowledge of the debtor that the injury was
substantially certain to result. A significant number of courts consid-
ering Kawaauhau permit intent to include circumstances where the
debtor performs actions that are known by the actor to be "substan-
tially certain to cause injury."105
In Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger),106 the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals suggests that the debtor's subjective knowledge that his
actions are substantially certain to result in injury would be sufficient
to satisfy the willfulness requirement. 07 The court stated that "the
real question is whether Dr. Geiger believed that these consequences
were substantially certain to occur at the time that he attempted his
treatment .... This is an important distinction, one in fact that de-
fines the boundary between intentional and unintentional torts."108
The court went on to say that [elven if Dr. Geiger should have be-
lieved that his treatment was substantially certain to produce serious
harmful consequences, he would be guilty only of professional mal-
practice, not of an intentional tort."109 The Eighth Circuit's reading of
intent suggests that intent under § 523(a)(6) is properly interpreted to
include subjective knowledge that injury is substantially certain to
occur.
Because of the Kawaauhau Court's reliance on intentional tort law
in determining the proper definition of "intent" under § 523(a)(6) and
because the Kawaauhau Court affirmed the lower court, which held
that subjective knowledge that injury is substantially certain to occur
105. See In re Slosberg, 225 B.R. at 18; see, e.g., Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 823-24
(5th Cir. 1998) (holding that injury might be intentional under Kawaauhau v.
Geiger if the professor/debtor kept fees knowing that it would deprive the univer-
sity of money to which it had legal rights); AVCO Fin. Servs. of Billings v. Kidd
(In re Kidd), 219 B.R. 278, 285 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998) (holding that the "subjec-
tive test" of the Kawaauhau v. Geiger willfulness inquiry includes either that the
act was done with specific intent to injure the creditor or the act was done know-
ing with substantial certainty, that the creditor would be harmed). But see Ber-
ger v. Buck (In re Buck), 220 B.R. 999, 1004 (B-A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the willful standard requires evidence that the debtor had "motive to harm" the
creditor); Florida Outdoor Equip., Inc. v. Tomlinson (In re Tomlinson), 220 B.R.
134, 137-38 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit "substan-
tially certain" standard is inconsistent with Kawaauhau v. Geiger and applying a
strict "intent to cause injury" standard).
106. 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1153 (1997), and affd, 118 S.
Ct. 974 (1998).
107. See id. at 853.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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was sufficient, a careful reading of Kawaauhau would permit intent to
be satisfied by showing either subjective intent to injure or subjective
knowledge that injury is substantially certain to result. In addition,
this position strikes an appropriate balance between the policy which
seeks to provide honest debtors with a fresh start and the right of a
creditor to secure payment of debts which appropriately fall under the
discharge exception.
Despite the Kawaauhau Court's reliance on the Restatement and
its strong allusion to the intentional torts in general, a number of cir-
cuits have interpreted Kawaauhau as requiring a subjective intent to
injure to satisfy willfulness under § 523(a)(6).11o In Berger v. Buck (In
re Buck),111 the Bankruptcy Appeals Panel of the Tenth Circuit, with-
out considering the possibility that the debtor had subjective knowl-
edge that injury was substantially certain to result, suggested that
because no evidence supported a finding that the debtor had a motive
to harm the creditor, the debt would be dischargeable under
Kawaauhau.-1 2
In Florida Outdoor Equipment, Inc. v. Tomlinson (In re Tomlin-
son),113 the court strictly construed the language of Kawaauhau to re-
quire a showing of intentional and deliberate injury to satisfy
§ 523(a)(6) and held that the debtor's conduct must have been done
with actual intent to cause injury to come within the discharge excep-
tion.1 ' 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Tomlinson Court expressly
rejected the prior position of the Eleventh Circuit that had included
acts substantially certain to cause injury in the willful and malicious
framework.115
These courts, however, fail to give proper attention to the reliance
that the Kawaauhau Court places on the Restatement definition of in-
tent. In addition, such a narrow interpretation of intent would render
the § 523(a)(6) discharge exception largely unavailable to creditors in
many circumstances in which debts should properly be excepted from
discharge.116 An examination of the debts related to the conversion of
secured property exemplifies this potential problem.
110. See, e.g., Hartley v. Jones (Matter of Hartley), 869 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that it is the injury to the creditor, not the act to the debtor, which must
be intentional); In re Buck, 220 B.R. at 1004 (holding that the willful standard
requires evidence that the debtor has "motive to harm" the creditor); In re Tom-
linson, 220 B.R. at 137-38 (holding the Kawaauhau v. Geiger requires a showing
of intentional and deliberate injury).
111. 220 B.R. 999 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998).
112. See id. at 1004.
113. 220 B.R. 134 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
114. See id. at 138.
115. See id.
116. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 82-83.
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Under a definition of "intent" requiring subjective intent to injure,
a debt arising from a conversion case where a debtor converts a secur-
ity to his own use without consent of the creditor holding a security
interest will almost never be found nondischargeable under the willful
and malicious injury discharge exception. In the normal conversion
case, the debtor will most likely not intend to injure the creditor.17
Usually the debtor intends to benefit himself by taking the security
interest and does not intend to injure the creditor at all.11 At the
time of conversion, the debtor may fully intend to repay the debt to the
creditor. Even if the debtor actually intends to harm the creditor, the
subjective intent of the debtor will be nearly impossible to prove be-
cause a debtor in bankruptcy will always be able to argue that the
conversion was related to financial difficulties and not intent to injure
the creditor.1 ' 9
Therefore, a narrow scope of intent satisfied only by a showing of
subjective intent to injure permits a debtor's financial difficulties to
serve as ajustification for the conversion of collateral and a rebuttal to
the discharge exception's requirement of intent to harm the credi-
tor.1 2 0 Under this standard of intent, a creditor is essentially denied
his security interest in the secured property because of the nearly im-
possible burden placed upon him to prove that the debtor subjectively
intended to injure him.121 This effect is shown by courts that have
adopted a definition of "malice" requiring subjective intent to injure.
These courts almost always decided in favor of the debtor and grant
discharge. 12 2
The result is much different if intent may be satisfied where the
debtor has subjective knowledge that his actions are substantially cer-
tain to result in injury to the creditor. Utilizing this broader scope of
intent, a debtor's actions will be found willful under § 523(a)(6) where
the debtor has subjective knowledge that his conversion is substan-
tially certain to harm the creditor. Under this interpretation, effect is
given to the security interest held by the creditor in circumstances
where a debtor knowingly violates the security agreement and the
debtor will be denied discharge of this debt contingent on a finding of
malice.
In addition, an honest debtor inadvertently converting secured
property will still be able to discharge the debt in bankruptcy consis-
tent with the fundamental goal of the bankruptcy code to provide the
honest debtor with a fresh start. Debtors who are unaware that their
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 B.R. 766, 776 (Bankr. N.D. M11. 983).
121. See id. at 772.
122. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 83.
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actions will harm the creditor or who are unaware of the existence of a
security agreement may discharge their debts in bankruptcy because
they possess neither subjective intent to injure the creditor nor subjec-
tive knowledge that their actions are substantially certain to injure
the creditor. Therefore, defining intent to include subjective substan-
tial certainty that injury will result protects the security interest of
creditors under circumstances where the debtor acts with knowledge
of the agreement while at the same time still permits an honest debtor
without knowledge of the security interest to discharge the debts in
bankruptcy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The discharge exception for willful and malicious injury is an area
of United States bankruptcy law where the competing policy consider-
ations of the bankruptcy code collide. Bankruptcy law is premised on
the idea of granting the honest debtor a fresh start to allow that per-
son to once again become a productive member of society.123 How-
ever, the policy behind the bankruptcy discharge exceptions seeks to
prevent the discharge of certain debts arising from culpable conduct.
The careful interpretation of bankruptcy discharge exceptions is es-
sential to preventing an imbalance between these competing policy
considerations.
In Kawaauhau v. Geiger, the Supreme Court held that willfulness
under § 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury as op-
posed to a deliberate or intentional act resulting in injury. This hold-
ing correctly limits the discharge exception to cases involving
intentional conduct by the debtor and insures that honest debtors will
receive the fresh start to which they are entitled under the bank-
ruptcy code. However, the Court's failure to clearly define the scope of
"intent" creates the risk that this exception will be interpreted too nar-
rowly and permit the discharge of debts arising from culpable conduct,
the discharge of which a creditor should be protected from under the
exception.
To insure that the willful and malicious injury discharge exception
is correctly interpreted to provide honest debtors a fresh start while at
the same time protecting creditors from the discharge of debts result-
ing from culpable conduct, it is necessary to clarify the scope of "in-
tent" under Kawaauhau. Defining the scope of intent to include
subjective intent to cause injury and subjective knowledge of the
debtor that injury is substantially certain to result achieves the
proper balance between the competing policy considerations of the
Bankruptcy Code. This interpretation allows the honest debtor a
fresh start and at the same time protects creditors from the discharge
123. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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of debts arising from conduct that was intended to injure the creditor
or from which the debtor was substantially certain the creditor would
be injured.
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